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The question of how to proceed with illegal immigrants arriving in the southern EU member 
states is one of the pressing policy issues for the EU. In our article we will provide a thorough 
analysis of immigration policy and immigration amnesties from an economist’s perspective. 
In particular, we are interested in answering questions such as why (at all) some states 
legalize irregular immigrants and what effects unilateral policy measures in this field have in 
an economic union such as the EU. While most of the work in the area of immigration 
amnesties focuses on the single country case we extend this scenario to the case in which the 
legalizing country is part of a federation and spillover effects between different states may 
occur. Several interesting aspects will be considered in this context, in particular, potential 
changes of the policy mix between internal and external enforcement on the one hand and 
legalization on the other hand when a federal setting is considered instead of a single country.   
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1. Introduction 
The debate about illegal immigration captures much public attention in the European Union 
as well as in the United States.
1 Due to a large disparity in income levels between the EU and 
African or Eastern European countries there is a substantial migratory pressure especially to 
the Southern European countries. In the last 25 years national governments have responded to 
this phenomenon by increasingly granting legal status to migrants that have illegally crossed 
the border or overstayed their visas. Such extraordinary amnesties or regularization programs
2 
are often part of a broader immigration policy reform accompanied by an intensification of 
internal and external migration controls. While it appears – at a first glance – contradictory to 
keep migrants out on one hand and give them legal status on the other hand, there is some 
rationale for this policy mix. 
In our article we will provide a thorough analysis of immigration policy with a special focus 
on immigration amnesties from an economist’s perspective. In particular, we are interested in 
answering questions such as why (at all) some states legalize irregular immigrants and what 
effects unilateral policy measures in this field have in an economic union such as the EU. The 
first question has been dealt with in the literature before, for example, by Hillman and Weiss 
(1998), Epstein and Weiss (2001) or Chau (2001). However, neither of these studies or – to 
our knowledge – any other theoretical study
3 has yet discussed the highly relevant scenario, in 
which the legalizing country is part of a federation and in which spillover effects between 
different states may occur. Several interesting aspects have to be considered in this context, in 
particular, potential changes of the policy mix between internal and external enforcement on 
the one hand and legalization on the other hand in a federal setting as compared to a single 
national state.   
The relevance of the topic is well illustrated by the immigration policy in Spain.
4 Until the 
1990s Spain was a net population exporter, later it became a receiving country. According to 
EUROSTAT the number of foreigners living legally in Spain skyrocketed from 398.000 non-
nationals in 1990 to 2.772.000 in 2004. These numbers, however, do not account for the 
presence of illegal migrants. Since, according to Baldwin-Edwards (2006), some of the most 
important routes for illegal migration to the EU lead to Spain, it is likely that the latter number 
has followed a similar pattern. Arango and Jachimowicz (2005) estimate the stock of migrants 
illegally present in Spain in 2005 to be in the order of 1.200.000. 
Like some of its Southern European neighbour countries Spain has made repeated use of 
extraordinary regularization programs over the past 20 years, thereby granting legal status to 
irregular migrants residing in the country at the time of the programs’ introduction. From 
1985 to 2005 Spain altogether enacted six amnesties and thus legalized a total of 
approximately 1.2 million illegal migrants, whereas the most recent amnesty in 2005 alone 
accounted for the legalization of approximately 700.000 illegal aliens.  
It is crucial to distinguish amnesties (as analyzed in this paper) from the possibility of 
migrants to apply for asylum. While the former is an extraordinary project of the government 
                                                 
1 This article focuses on the situation in the EU. For an overview of the most recent discussion on immigration 
reform in the U.S. cf. Jencks (2007). 
2 In the following we will use the terms “amnesty”, “regularization program” and “legalization program” 
interchangeably, although some authors point out a difference.  For example, Papademetriou et al. (2004) find 
the term “legalization” more appropriate to the U.S. policy where such programs have granted permanent 
settlement rights. Accordingly, the term “regularization” fits the European case where granting temporary 
residence and work permit are more common. 
3 Jahn (1998) considers the decision over border enforcement in an area of free movement but does not go on to 
consider the case of an amnesty in such a setting. 
4 A more detailed description of the Regularization and Immigration Policy in Spain can be found in Arango and 
Jachimowicz (2005).    3
to grant residence and/or work permit to a large number of illegal aliens, the latter is an 
individual decision for each refugee. Under the Geneva Convention each refugee has the right 
to apply for asylum.
5 Formally, introducing asylum legislation has to be considered as a 
fundamental constitutional decision which is – after its introduction – no longer a political 
choice variable. Immigration amnesties, on the other hand, are „exceptional measures, 
undertaken only after much national soul-searching and lengthy, passionate debates among 
lawmakers, migrant organizations, and business interest groups” (Levinson, 2005a). 
Due to common legislation in EU immigration policy and due to relatively low barriers to 
movement inside the EU common market or, more specifically, the territory of the member 
states of the Schengen acquis, the Spanish naturalization policy did not affect Spain alone. 
There exists the possibility for legalized immigrants (more than for illegal immigrants) to 
move on to fellow EU member states. The fear of those countries of a possible influx of 
unskilled legalized migrants is well illustrated by the reactions to the policy of Spain (and 
Italy, respectively). For example, Germany and the Netherlands criticized Spain during a 
meeting of EU ministers of the interior for acting arbitrarily and uncoordinated with its fellow 
member states and phrased their concern that legalized immigrants could also enter other 
member states.
6 Similar comments came from the governments of Austria and Switzerland 
that “accused Italy of turning a blind eye to would-be refugees heading north.“
7 
Spain is not the only country prone to illegal immigration that has intensively used 
regularization or legalization programs in the past. As can be seen from Table 1 there are also 
other southern EU member countries that responded to an increasing influx of illegal migrants 
by granting repeated amnesties. For example, Italy legalized nearly 700.000 illegal aliens in 
2002, thereby enacting the second largest amnesty program worldwide to that date. In total, 
Italy legalized around 1.4 million illegal migrants since its first amnesty in 1986. More 
northern EU member states which traditionally have a large number of immigrants such as 
Germany, the Netherlands or Austria are very reluctant when it comes to enacting 
immigration amnesties.
8 The large regularization programs in the southern European 
countries are only exceeded by the legalization policy in the United States that regularized 
over 2.5 million clandestine workers alone in 1986 in the course of the Immigration Reform 
Control Act (IRCA). However, in relation to total population size European programs are 
larger.
 9 
From a theoretical perspective immigration amnesties are introduced as long as their 
beneficial economic effects outweigh their negative effects. In our article, we will present the 
most relevant of these effects, ranging from labor market effects to the impact on voter 
behaviour.
10 Specifically, we will show that the marginal benefit of internal and external 
enforcement, i.e., for example border controls and workplace raids, respectively, is falling in 
the stock of illegal immigrants. At the same time, with reasonable assumptions about 
marginal costs of enforcement it can be shown that undiscovered illegal immigration induces 
                                                 
5 Hatton (2004) offers a survey of the common EU asylum policy. 
6 Deutsche Welle (2005). 
7 The Economist (6. September 2001), cited in Facchini et al. (2006). 
8 Recently, there has been a discussion in Germany whether to legalize a small group of former refugees, who 
live well-integrated, but without a residence permit, in Germany already for a very long time and who will – 
realistically – never be able to return to their home countries. 
9 One distinction between the characteristics of the legalization programs in Europe and the U.S. is noteworthy. 
Whereas the residence permit in the course of the IRCA was a permanent one, the residence permits in Europe 
are in general only temporary. For example, the 2005 amnesty in Spain granted only a one-year renewable 
permit to the applicants (see Table 1 for an overview of the characteristics of several legalization programs) 
10 Note that our article deals with economic and politico-economic aspects only. However, we are well aware 
that there are several other reasons (beyond economics) which may explain the need of an immigration amnesty, 
such as humanitarian or social reasons.   4
incentives for immigration amnesties, which are chosen optimally chosen and timed 
according to the needs of the host country alone.  
 






1974‐1975  7.448  All foreigners  Permanent residence and work permit 
1995‐1999  6.137  Exceptional circumstances  Permanent residence and work permit 
Belgium 
2000  60.000  Exceptional circumstances  Permanent residence and work permit 
1973  40.000  Workers  Permanent residence and work permit 
1981‐1982  121.100  Workers  Permanent residence and work permit 
1991  15.000  Rejected Asylum seekers  Permanent residence and work permit 
France 
1997‐1998  77.800  Family Reunification  Permanent residence and work permit 
1996  7.856  Rejected Asylum seekers  Permanent residence and work permit  Germany 
1999  23.000  Rejected Asylum seekers  Permanent residence and work permit 
1997‐1998  369.600  Workers  6 month residence and work permit  Greece 
2001  351.000  Workers  6 month residence and work permit 
1987‐1988  118.700  Workers  Residence and work permit 
1990  217.700  All foreigners  2 year renewable residence and work permit 
1996  147.900  Workers  2 year renewable residence and work permit 





Luxembourg  2001  2.850  Workers  Residence and work permit 
1975  15.000  Workers  Permanent residence and work permit 
1979  1.800  Workers  Permanent residence and work permit 
Netherlands 
1991‐1994  2.000  All foreigners  Permanent residence and work permit 
1992‐1993  39.200  Workers  Residence and work permit 
1996  21.800  Workers  Residence and work permit 
Portugal 
2001  120.200  Workers  Residence and work permit 
1985‐1986  43.800  All foreigners  Residence and work permit 
1991  110.100  Workers  Residence and work permit 
1996  21.300  All foreigners  One‐year residence and work permit 
2000  163.900  All foreigners  One‐year residence and work permit 
2001  216.400  Workers  One‐year residence and work permit 
Spain 










1998‐1999  600  Domestic workers  One‐year renewable residence and work 
permit 
1986  1.600.000  General Legalization  Permanent residence and work permit  United 
States  1986  1.100.000  Agricultural Workers  Permanent residence and work permit 
Source: Papademetriou, et al. (2004), Levinson (2005b) 
 
In an economic union with low internal mobility barriers the optimal immigration amnesty 
turns out to be different because of negative external effects which may lead – according to   5
the traditional theory of externalities – to a too large number of legalized aliens. The reason is 
that from a single member state’s perspective there is no (economic) reason to consider the 
amnesty’s effect on neighbour countries. When at least some legalized immigrants move on 
from, say, Spain to Germany they no longer exert a negative marginal effect on the Spanish 
economy, such that yet another illegal migrant may be legalized before the optimum is 
reached. Negative effects on the German economy or German politics are of no relevance for 
Spanish policy makers who seek to optimize their immigration policy in order to either 
maximize domestic welfare or to gain political support. This may explain why countries like 
Germany complained about the latest Spanish immigration amnesties. 
This example allows us to derive further important insights. In an economic union, member 
states’ free-riding on public goods provision may be an important problem. The traditional 
instrument to internalize external effects is so-called Pigou taxation or subsidization, 
respectively, of the activity resulting in the externality. When northern EU member states 
want southern member states to abstain from amnesties, a well-designed subsidization of the 
southern states may be the most effective instrument. In our analysis we will show that 
subsidizing enforcement measures will achieve the desired outcome. The problem is, 
however, that if one country (e.g. Germany) pays subsidies other countries with similar 
interest may want to free-ride on these payments and not pay their share. This is what 
happened to the Nautilus initiative (border controls in the Mediterranean Sea), which had to 
be suspended in summer 2007 due to a lack of funds from the EU member states. Similar 
problems can be seen in the case of Malta, a country receiving many illegal immigrants, 
which receives hardly any support from other EU member states. Malta’s problem is that 
illegal immigrants are caught on the island such that there is hardly any way for them to move 
on to other member states (unlike in the Spanish case). Without externalities, not supporting 
Malta is therefore the optimal strategy for the rest of the EU member states.   
A detailed discussion of these aspects will follow in the rest of this paper which is organized 
as follows. Section 2 analyzes the situation in the legalizing country. Since this is the “port of 
entry” for illegal immigrants coming from Africa to the EU we discuss costs and benefits of 
illegal immigration for this country. Given that immigration amnesties are a possible policy 
measure for dealing with illegal immigrants we introduce a simple framework to demonstrate 
the decision-making process leading to an amnesty. Section 3 describes the situation of the 
country of final destination, i.e. countries like Germany or Austria. We ask whether and when 
legalized migrants move on to those northern European EU member states and which 
economic consequences these states face. Our discussion continues in Section 4 where we 
present some solutions – based on Section 2’s model – for the problems arising from an 
amnesty in a federal setting. Alternative measures like foreign aid to African countries or a 
reform of the legal restrictions to enter the EU are considered as well. Finally, Section 5 
summarizes and concludes. 
 
2. The Legalizing Country´s Perspective 
In this section we will focus on the consequences of illegal immigration and immigration 
amnesties for the host country. In our case, the host country is defined as the “port of entry”, 
where illegal immigrants enter the EU and that will eventually decide whether to legalize 
them or not, i.e. one of the southern European countries situated at the Mediterranean Sea. 
Furthermore, we introduce a simple non-technical framework to illustrate the decision process 
of policy makers when deciding over regularization. 
   6
2.1 The costs and benefits of illegal immigration for the host country – A brief review of 
the literature 
The early literature (for example, Sjaastad, 1962, or Berry and Soligo, 1969) considered – in 
principle – any form of migration, including illegal immigration, as welfare improving and 
thus unambiguously positive. In a competitive setting the movement of the production factor 
labor improves allocational efficiency through eliminating factor price differentials. However, 
while from the “world’s” perspective welfare increases, a single country may not consider 
migration as desirable.  
The reasons why a country might not desire immigration, and especially that of unskilled – 
and possibly illegal – workers, are discussed, for example, in Borjas (1994) and Mayda 
(2005), who analyse both economic and non-economic motives. On the one hand there is a 
concern that the influx of immigrants might have a negative influence on wage levels or the 
unemployment rate. In addition immigrants are often perceived as net welfare recipients, 
thereby creating a loss for the native population.
11 On the other hand there may be xenophobia 
as well as security or cultural concerns related to immigration.  
According to Epstein and Weiss (2001) the social costs of illegal immigration are presumably 
higher than those of legal migration. This might occur because illegal migrants have a higher 
probability of getting involved in crime as victims as well as as felons. In addition a large 
presence of illegal migrants may be presumed as a sign of impotence of the acting 
government. Furthermore a large stock of not tax-paying migrants might also lower the tax 
morale in parts of the legal population. Last but not least the presence of illegal aliens and 
their situation might be considered as inhumane. However, although it appears – at a first 
glance – that illegal migration is supply-side driven and generally rejected by domestic 
population, this is only one part of the story. There exists a demand for illegal immigrants as 
well. 
Therefore, the literature on the economic effects of illegal migration can be divided in works 
that are concerned with the supply side of illegal immigration as well as those focussing on 
the demand side. Most works are concerned with the former, where the host country does not 
desire immigration in general but has nevertheless to deal with an existing migratory pressure. 
An early work in this context is Ethier (1986), who demonstrates the benefits of restricting 
migration in the framework of a minimum wage setting à la Harris and Todaro (1970). He 
mainly sees three reasons for limiting the inflow of foreign workers. The first is the 
maximization of national income by affecting the foreign country’s wage level, the second 
objective is to influence the income distribution and the third are measures to prevent negative 
effects for the social stability. Furthermore the authors demonstrate that the host country can 
cut down the cost of its restrictive immigration policy by using a combination of both internal 
and external enforcement, instead of relying on one policy tool alone. 
Djajic (1997) analyzes the effects of illegal immigration on resource allocation, wages and 
commodity prices in the short run as well as in the long run. He finds negative wage effects 
for competing workers in the short run. In the long run, however, the factor labor might in 
general benefit from illegal migrants due to increasing economic rents. Especially in 
industries like agriculture, the building and service industry and health care irregular workers 
may induce economic benefits (cf. Krissman, 2001). The employers of illegal aliens gain from 
their presence because wages for irregular migrants are usually lower than for legal migrants 
and working conditions are below the national standard.
12 The benefits of irregular workers 
                                                 
11 Razin and Sadka (1995) offer a formal analysis of the negative effects of unskilled immigration on the welfare 
system when wages are rigid. Brücker et al. (2001) give a detailed presentation of the welfare dependency of 
immigrants in Europe. 
12 Cf. Cobb-Clark and Kossoudji (2000).   7
accrue not only to the employers but also to the population as a whole by bringing down the 
costs of goods and services. 
In this context Karlson and Katz (2003) offer an interesting explanation why governments on 
the one hand limit the influx of migrants through border enforcement and on the other hand 
repeatedly grant legal status by applying amnesty programs. If the government wishes to 
attract only high-skilled illegal migrants, it may choose a policy mix of enforcing the border 
and offering the possibility of becoming legalized with a certain probability which attracts 
only high-skilled illegal migrants. This self-selecting process is achieved through higher 
expected wage income of skilled compared to unskilled migrants after legalization. 
As pointed out by Borjas (2006), immigration policy has to be seen as just another 
redistribution program. In the case of unskilled illegal migration unskilled native workers are 
hit by the influx, on the other side employers of unskilled workers are  likely to benefit most 
from the increased supply of workers. Immigration policy will thus be a result of a political 
decision process that is characterized by the competing interests of those groups. The works 
by Benhabib (1996), Hillman and Weiss (1998) and Garcia (2006) analyze the determination 
of the immigration policy in the political process. They apply the median voter model, in 
which the politician aims to win the election by capturing the median voter. A slightly 
different approach has been offered by Epstein and Nitzan (2006), who argue that 
immigration policy is strongly affected by interest groups and lobbying. In general, one can 
conclude from the public-choice literature that the prevalence of immigration restrictions 
suggests that (worse-off) adversaries to a liberal immigration and enforcement policy 
outweigh (better-off) advocates of this policy. 
 
2.2. Policy tools in dealing with illegal migrants – Enforcement vs. amnesty provision 
As previously mentioned there are basically three policy instruments which may be used to 
curtail the influx of migrants and to deal with a given stock of illegal aliens present in the 
country. These are  
•  external enforcement (through tightening the border),  
•  internal enforcement (e.g., through workplace raids and employer sanctions), and  
•  legalization of illegal aliens.
13,14   
Enforcement activities appear in several forms. The most visible are undertakings to secure 
the border, which is also at the heart of the EU policy against unwanted immigration.
15 This is 
usually done by erecting obstacles to hinder illegal immigrants from crossing the border. The 
most obvious barriers can be found in the Spanish exclaves in Ceuta and Melilla. But in 
contrast to the over 3000 km length of the Mexican-U.S. border, the Southern European 
countries are separated from Northern Africa by the Mediterranean Sea. Due to this maritime 
border, physical barriers cannot be erected to steer the influx of migrants. Instead the Spanish 
authorities must focus their efforts on detection and apprehension. In the past some main 
routes of entrance to the EU have evolved as Figure 1 demonstrates.
16 
                                                 
13 For instance the IRCA reform encompassed a tightening of external border control, intensification of 
workplace controls as well as granting permanent residence to illegal migrants, cf., e.g., Orrenius and Zavodny 
(2001).  
14 Another possibility is the deportation of illegal aliens, but due to humanitarian concerns this is generally not 
considered a feasible option. 
15 Cf. Verbruggen (2005). 
16 For further information on border enforcement at the Spanish-African border see Carling (2007).   8
Another characteristic of a maritime border like the Mediterranean Sea is that according to the 
Geneva Convention on asylum policy each refugee has the right to apply for asylum after 
entering the country. Since the Mediterranean Sea does not constitute sovereign territory of 
the Southern European states detecting migrants on the open sea enables those countries to 





Figure 1: Key migrant routes from Africa to Europe (BBC, 2007). 
 
In spite of the efforts to enforce the external border of the EU the influx of illegal immigrants 
cannot be prevented entirely. Indeed, estimations of illegal presence in the EU range from 5 to 
8 million individuals.
18 To fight the presence of illegal aliens the member states invest in 
internal enforcement. According to Broeders (2007) and Broeders and Engbersen (2007) 
especially the northern member states have intensified their efforts on surveillance in recent 
years. Measures in the fight against illegal aliens comprise workplace raids, exclusion from 
societal institutions and deportations in individual cases. Currently several member states are 
developing electronical databases to identify illegal aliens.  
The benefits of the regularization of illegal migrants are mostly remedies for the negative 
aspects of illegal migration. For example, Cobb-Clark and Kossoudji (2000, 2002) point out 
that the 1986 U.S. IRCA programme accomplished objectives like an improvement in wages 
and labor market opportunities, so that migrants could more easily find higher paying jobs 
matching their personal skill level. In the same direction points the work by Coniglio et al. 
                                                 
17 This procedure was criticized by “Amnesty International” and “Pro Asyl” in September 2007 as not being in 
compliance with basic human rights, cf. http://www.proasyl.de/fileadmin/proasyl/fm_redakteure/Europa/ 
Frontex/Gutachten_Geltung_MRe_auf_See_Sept._2007.pdf. 
18 Note that estimations of the number of illegal immigrants are controversial because most government data 
systems do not report them, besides there exist immense difficulties in getting correct estimations. Jandl (2004) 
gives an overview of several techniques of how to measure the total stock and inflow of illegal immigrants to a 
region.    9
(2006) who consider an amnesty programme as a tool that enables migrants to fully apply 
their skill level on the host countries labour market.  
According to Levinson (2005b) a regularization might – from the host country’s government 
perspective –  
•  increase tax and social security revenues, 
•  help to reduce the size of the underground economy, 
•  “wipe the slate clean” for future immigration enforcement,
19 
•  acquire information about illegal aliens,  
•  improve the credibility of the government, 
•  lessen political pressure from foreign forces, for example when joining multinational 
agreements like the EU. 
However, note that not all of these positive aspects are equally likely to occur. As 
Papademetriou et al. (2004) explain, regularization does not guarantee lifting the illegal aliens 
into the formal sector. Some regularized migrants may choose to or be bound to remain in the 
informal economy, when for instance their skill level does not match the needs of the formal 
labor market. 
On the downside of a regularization program are concerns like political and social tensions 
from rewarding lawbreakers and encouraging further illegal immigration. Furthermore, a 
possible increase in the use of public services like health care and education is feared as well 
as a decrease in the wages of competing workers. 
 
2.3 A simple model of enforcement and migration amnesties 
In order to get a better insight into the underlying mechanisms of and interactions between 
enforcement policy and immigration amnesties, we introduce a simple graphical framework 
on which we will later (in Section 4.1) base our argument regarding the effects of immigration 
amnesties in the EU. The following assumptions help to keep the model as simple as possible: 
•  The benevolent government cares only about the welfare of its native residents. It does 
not care about illegal or legal migrants.  
•  In the beginning there is a certain presence of illegal and legal migrants in the country. 
•  The government decides over two policy instruments: border enforcement and 
regularization of illegal aliens. 
•  Immigrants are always net beneficiaries of the host country’s fiscal activities, i.e. even if 
they contribute (as legalized migrants) to the state budget this does not outweigh the 
negative effect of reduced per-capita consumption of (impure
20) public goods following 
an increasing number of users due to (legal and illegal) immigration.
21 The negative 
effect is stronger for immigrants remaining illegal than for those becoming regularized. 
                                                 
19 For more on the theory of “wiping the slate clean”, cf. Chau (2001). 
20 The public good is impure in the sense that the property of non-rivalness in consumption does not hold fully, 
i.e., with many users congestion costs arise which eventually lead to lower per-capita consumption.  
21 Cf. Krieger et al. (2007) for a more thorough analysis of the effects of immigration on public goods provision 
and its consequences for immigration amnesties.    10
•  It is not possible for the government to completely stop the influx of illegal migrants. 
Border enforcement will decrease the influx but some persons will always manage to 
trickle through. 
Consider now marginal costs and benefits of border enforcement. We assume – for better 
graphical presentation and without loss of generality – that marginal costs of enforcement are 
constant, i.e., independent of the existing stock of illegal immigrants. Strengthening border 
controls by one “unit” (for example, by an additional border guard) will always impose the 
same cost.
22 The marginal benefits from border enforcement on the other hand are falling with 
the stock of illegal immigrants. Enforcement limits the number of non-contributing users of 
the (impure) public good financed from the state budget, such that per-capita consumption is 
higher compared to a situation without enforcement. However, when already many illegal 
immigrants are net beneficiaries consuming the public good and when per-capita consumption 
is already rather low additional enforcement will only have a small positive effect. Hence, for 
a large stock of illegal immigrants living in the country the marginal benefit of external 
enforcement is rather low. 
 
Figure 2: Marginal Costs and Benefits of Enforcement and Incentives for Migration 
Amnesties 
 
                                                 
22 Despite the previous assumption that the net effect of illegal immigration deriving from public good 
consumption is negative, it appears to be more realistic to assume increasing marginal costs of enforcement 
because with an increasing stock of illegal immigrants at least some tax contributions can be expected (e.g. from 
VAT).    11
Figure 2 shows the constant marginal cost (MC) and the falling marginal benefit (MB) curves. 
Let us assume that in period t marginal cost equals marginal benefit. Between period t and 
t+1 some illegal immigrants trickle into the country despite border controls. The stock of 
illegal immigrants rises from Mt to Mt+1. This dilutes per-capita consumption of the public 
good further (MB falls) and leads to a welfare loss indicated by the shaded area. From the 
host country’s perspective two solutions can be imagined. First, at a lower marginal cost of 
enforcement the number of illegal migrants slipping through the borders could be reduced. 
However, this solution is not feasible as the host country cannot reduce marginal costs.
23 This 
leaves only to reduce the number of illegal aliens living in the host country. This can be done 
by introducing an immigration amnesty which reduces the stock of irregular immigrants to the 
previous level (Mt) where MB equals MC again and where the welfare loss disappears.
24,25 It 
is clearly the optimal strategy for a benevolent, welfare-maximizing government to follow 
this strategy. 
It should be noted, however, that this very simplified framework ignores several other 
influences on the decision whether to legalize or not. In particular, we have abstracted from 
important aspects such as distributional issues or the political process. Nevertheless, the 
model helps to understand the rationale for immigration amnesties. With a too large stock of 
illegal aliens living in the country, regularization will allow to reduce a resulting welfare loss. 
In Section 4.1, we will extend this framework and show that within an economic union such 
as the EU there exists an incentive for the host country to legalize more immigrants than 
under this section’s scenario.  
 
3. Adapting to the Situation in the EU – A Federal Perspective 
Having dealt with the perspective of the legalizing country in the previous section, we will 
now consider the situation of the fellow member countries in the European Union. For this 
purpose we will start with a brief description of the current EU immigration policy. After that 
we will discuss incentives for migrants to move on within the European Union, i.e. from one 
member country to another. The section closes with an examination of the consequences of 
onward migration for the countries of final destination. We discuss the labor market impact as 
well as the effects on the welfare systems in order to see whether the anxieties of these 
countries towards immigration are justified. 
 
3.1 The EU immigration policy 
A common European immigration policy develops only cautiously, due to the fear of the 
member states to lose sovereignty over this important policy issue. According to Baldwin-
Edwards (2006) the focus of the recent achievements of the common immigration policy lies 
on security aspects like border enforcement and expulsion of illegal migrants while other 
issues like legalization of illegal migrants or immigration to meet labor market needs have 
been absent until very recently when the debate about the so-called Blue Card started (see 
Section 4.3 for details).   
The most obvious achievement of the common immigration policy is the Schengen acquis 
which removed barriers to mobility for workers and households inside the Schengen territory. 
In consequence EU citizens have the freedom to live and work where they choose within this 
                                                 
23 For example, it is not realistic to assume that the cost of border guards can easily be reduced. 
24 An alternative interpretation would be to argue that an amnesty is equivalent to increasing the marginal benefit 
of illegal immigration. This argument follows because a legalized immigrant reduces the net cost of public goods 
due to her tax payments. 
25 A total of (Mt+1 – Mt) immigrants will be legalized.   12
region. In contrast to this, barriers against immigration for non-EU nationals have been 
established in most member states and at EU level after the first oil price crises in 1973. These 
barriers have been reinforced with the introduction of the Schengen acquis. 
Since every migrant who arrives on the territory of the European Union has the right to apply 
for asylum, it is worth taking a closer look at the EU legislation on asylum policy. The rules 
of admitting asylum seekers and refugees as well as the national practices of proceeding with 
non-accepted asylum seekers and refugees are not yet harmonized in the EU. Usually, only 
very few applications for political asylum and refugee status are accepted. However, many 
humanitarian migrants are nevertheless tolerated in EU countries, even though their 
application for asylum status has been rejected.
26 Many EU countries have tightened the legal 
and administrative rules for admitting asylum seekers to limit entries and shorten the duration 
of stays.
27 According to Boeri et al. (2002) a “race to the bottom” among member states is 
unavoidable if migrants face different national rules. Caviedes (2004) supports this concern 
by stating that “tolerating different regimes invites competitive policy-making that can 
impose externalities upon fellow member states”. Such externalities are not limited to the case 
of asylum policy. Therefore, the EU also established common rules on how to deal with the 
issue of illegal immigration. In 2002, the EU Council enacted a comprehensive scheme to 
combat illegal immigration and trafficking of human beings on the summit of Seville. This 
scheme encompasses measures on fields like visa policy, border management or return and 
readmission policy.
28 
Alscher (2005) concludes that the EU immigration policy is getting more and more a common 
topic of the EU-harmonization process. But the focus only lies on restrictive measures like 
coordination of external border control and a common asylum policy. Fields like the 
legalization of illegal immigrants remain national affairs and therefore suffer from a lack of 
coordination. This opens the door for more negative externalities effects, as encountered by 
Caviedes (2004), which may then lead to sub-optimal outcomes from a European welfare 
perspective. 
 
3.2 The situation of migrants – Can we expect onward migration? 
The existing literature on immigration amnesties deals with the situation of a single migrant-
receiving country that is not part of a federation. When considering the – more realistic – 
situation of low barriers to EU-internal migration a central question arises: Do illegal 
migrants arriving, for example, from Africa to Spain have an incentive to move on to other 
member countries? 
Let us realistically assume that there is always a certain number of illegal aliens not intending 
to stay in the country of first arrival in Europe, but planning to move on to other, more 
northern EU member states such as Germany, Austria or the Netherlands. Reasons for this 
behaviour are manifold. For instance, the existence of network effects may induce migrants to 
live in regions were there are relatives, friends or people from the same cultural background.
29  
If these networks exist in countries that are not easy to enter, migrants may choose a different 
“port of entry” and eventually move on to the final destination country.
30  
                                                 
26 In most migration amnesties, at least some rejected but not (yet) repulsed asylum seekers are regularized as 
well. 
27 See Hatton (2004) 
28 For a more detailed overview see Yoshida and Woodland (2005) 
29 Cf. Epstein and Gang (2004), Bauer et al. (2005) or Faria and Levy (2003) for related studies. 
30 This effect might be weakened due to the insight of Chiuri et al. (2007) that illegal migrants coming to Europe 
are mainly frontrunners, i.e. the first to migrate from their family.   13
In addition, the “safe third country” concept in EU asylum policy, introduced after the Dublin 
Convention, fosters onward migration. This concept states that countries are allowed to refuse 
asylum in case that the refugee has passed through a country deemed safe, where she could 
have sought asylum. The consequence mainly for African migrants is that they first have to 
apply for asylum in countries like Spain or Italy before they can move on to fellow EU 
member states.
31 
To get a clearer picture of the incentives concerning onward migration, data from surveys on 
illegal migrants arriving in Europe is necessary. Unfortunately, the data situation regarding 
illegal migrants coming to Europe is very dense.
32 One work that offers some insights on the 
preferences of illegal migrants coming to Europe is the field survey by Chiuri et al. (2007). 
They surveyed 920 apprehended illegal immigrants coming to Italy and found that about 23 
percent of them had the intention to move on to a different EU member state.  
Another critical point about illegal immigrants and their legalization in a federal setting is the 
question when illegal migrants dare to move on. As long as they are clandestine it is very 
likely that they avoid any activities which might arouse attention. A straightforward 
conclusion from this behaviour is that illegal aliens hardly intend to move to another EU 
country due to the fear of being detected at the (EU-internal) border. Therefore an amnesty 
has an important consequence: no longer being illegal, the mobility of (formerly illegal) 
migrants rises, making it more likely that they move to another member country. 
As far as we know, this effect has also not yet been dealt with in the literature. However, 
European policy makers seem to be aware of this potential problem, and first action is taken. 
In November 2003, EU directive 2003/109 was introduced which states that, inter alia, 
legalized migrants are only allowed to move on to another member country after a 5-year stay 
in the country of legalization. This underlines the anxiety of EU member states of becoming 
the final destination of former illegal aliens. 
 
3.3 The situation of the target country 
In this part we will briefly deal with the situation of the country of final destination. If at least 
some migrants move on once they are legalized, the country of final destination will be 
affected by an influx of presumably unskilled migrants which has to be interpreted as an 
external effect. External effects are defined as economic activities of an economic agent 
which have an impact on the well-being or welfare of another economic agent who is not 
compensated for this effect through the market process. Regarding immigration amnesties, the 
legalizing country does not take into account the influence of its policy on the welfare of its 
fellow member states. Consequently, the number of legalized migrants respectively the 
frequency of amnesty programs will be too high from a federal perspective.  
A corollary of this hypothesis is the question whether the economic effects of onward 
migration in fact justify the anxieties of the country of final destination. As previously 
mentioned in Section 2.1, the free mobility of labor improves allocational efficiency from an 
economic union’s joint perspective. Nevertheless may the consequences for the target country 
be negative. The reason for this may depend on the flexibility of the labor market or the 
design of the welfare state. With flexible wages, for example, an influx of unskilled labor may 
                                                 
31 For example, except for small maritime borders Germany is surrounded by „safe third countries“. Entering 
Germany without passing such a state is only possible via the large international airports in Frankfurt and 
Munich where it is easy to enforce border controls. This explains why the number of applications for asylum has 
dropped sharply after the introduction of the “safe third country” mode. 
32 The data situation on illegal immigration in the U.S. is in many cases more comprehensive because the IRCA 
was a hotly debated and widely analyzed project. Cf. e.g. the studies by Cobb-Clark and Kossoudji (2000, 2002).   14
lead to deterioration of competing workers’ wages; in the presence of wage rigidities the 
unemployment rate may rise. In addition, since immigrants tend to be net recipients of the 
welfare state (cf. Chand and Paldam, 2004, or Sinn, 2002) there may be further negative 
affects.  
The empirical evidence on labor market effects of migration are mixed so that the anxiety of 
member states towards an influx of legalized migrants may not be justified. As Zimmermann 
(1995) surveys most of the empirical work has failed to find a noticeable positive correlation 
between migration and unemployment. Figure 3 displays the connection between 
unemployment and the share of foreign population for selected countries and even finds a 
negative correlation between these variables. 
 
 
Figure 3: Relation between Unemployment Rate and Immigration for 1991 (Source: 
Zimmermann, 1995) 
 
Friedberg and Hunt (1995) confirm that most empirical analyses find no significant influence 
of immigration on either unemployment or wages. Averaging over other empirical studies, 
they conclude that a 10 percent increase in the share of immigrants reduces natives’ wages by 
at most one percent. More recent studies come to different conclusions. For example, Borjas 
(2003) offers an empirical approach that analyzes the wage effects on the national labor 
market, taking into account differences in work experience across workers. He concludes that 
a 10 percent increase in labor supply reduces competing wages substantially by 3 to 4 percent.  
In addition to possibly negative labor market effects there is a widespread fear that 
immigrants impose a negative burden on the host country’s welfare system. Brücker et al. 
(2001) offer a survey on the impact of immigration on the European welfare system. They 
conclude that migrant households have indeed a higher probability of depending on social 
assistance and welfare programs compared to native households. However, the effects are 
rather differentiated. Socio-economic characteristics of migrant families like lower education 
and lower age of the household head as well as a higher number of children make immigrants 
in general less likely to depend on old-age and health benefits, but more likely to rely on 
unemployment assistance and welfare benefits.    15
Summarizing the studies about the impact of immigration on the economy, we find 
ambiguous evidence. Whereas the discussion about the correct measurement of the wage 
impact of immigration is still not settled, there is no clear evidence that the impact is indeed 
negative. The evidence on the welfare effects of immigration is also mixed. While immigrants 
seem to rely more heavily on unemployment assistance than natives, they have a rather low 
tendency to depend on old-age and pension benefits. In fact, in most countries even unskilled 
immigration is seen as a measure for solving the demographic challenge (cf. Krieger, 2005). 
All in all the anxiety of EU member states regarding onward migration and the influx of 
unskilled migrants is only partly justified and maybe more a result of political forces 
interested in influencing immigration policy. 
 
4. The effects of onwards migration in a federation and possible solutions to resulting 
problems  
After presenting the situation in the legalizing country and in the country of final destination 
separately, this section brings together both branches. Specifically, we deal with the 
interaction between both countries’ policies and focus on the possibilities of the country of 
final destination (or the federation as a whole, respectively) to influence policy in the 
legalizing country. For this purpose we will draw on the theory of fiscal federalism that offers 
insights into the incentives of regional governments that are part of a federation and into the 
effects of fiscal transfers on different agents. 
 
4.1. Interregional transfer payments 
Interregional transfer payments are an important component of EU policy. They are granted 
through the so-called cohesion fund, which supports infrastructure projects like highways, 
railway stations or airports. In the financial year 2007 about 36% of the EU budget will be 
used for such subsidies.
33 
In the context of immigration policy, interregional payments are less obvious. Nevertheless 
they have already been dealt with in the literature. For instance, Myers and Papageorgiou 
(2000) as well as Hatzipanayotou and Michael (2005) analyze the case where direct payments 
from the host country to the country of origin restrain the influx of migrants that would 
otherwise have a negative impact on the domestic welfare system. In the same direction 
points the work by Fenge and Meier (2006) who demonstrate that interregional matching 
grants are a superior instrument, compared to wage subsidies, in limiting unwanted 
immigration. Another option which has not been analyzed in the literature so far is to grant 
interregional subsidies for border enforcement or in order to delay (or entirely stop) 
immigration amnesties. 
This policy option is indeed practised in the EU, as demonstrated by the existence of the 
FRONTEX agency.
34 This community body was introduced in 2005. Its main objective is to 
coordinate the efforts on border security between member states. In 2007, the FRONTEX 
joint operation Nautilus was started in order to support the enforcement of Southern European 
maritime borders of the EU. For this purpose also member states not bordering the 
Mediterranean Sea contributed financial and technical support for the surveillance of the 
maritime border. This contribution can be interpreted as interregional transfers from member 
states like Germany or Sweden to countries like Spain or Italy 
                                                 
33 Cf. European Commission (2007). 
34 A detailed overview of the FRONTEX agency can be found in Jorry (2007) and Carrera (2007).   16
To demonstrate how interregional transfers can be explained from an economic point of view 
we draw back on the concept of external effects introduced in Section 3.3. The literature on 
fiscal federalism has derived policy measures to alleviate the problems arising from external 
effects caused by policy setters not taking into account the consequences of their actions on 
another agents’ welfare. In our context, the most obvious remedy is a Pigouvian subsidy 
which influences the behaviour of the externality-causing agent. In the case of the 
immigration policy in the EU, this would be an interregional transfer payment from northern 
or central European states to the southern European member states. The contribution to 
FRONTEX may be interpreted as this kind of subsidy. 
Returning to our model from Section 2.3, we can now show how onward migration and 
interregional transfers in an economic union affect the extent of the migration amnesty. Figure 
4 replicates the previous Figure 2 and includes the relevant new effects. Recall how we 
interpreted the MB curve: A benefit from enforcement arises because per-capita consumption 
is reduced less compared to a situation without any enforcement. Given that onward migration 
occurs, the marginal benefit from enforcement is zero for any migrant moving on to northern 
European states as none of them consumes the domestic public good. Onward migration may 
therefore be interpreted as a downward shift of the MB curve. Clearly, this means that at 
period t+1 the marginal benefit falls even further below the marginal cost such that the extend 
of the immigration amnesty has to be larger (Mt+1 – M’ instead of Mt+1 – Mt) because of a 
greater welfare loss (ACE instead of BCD).  
 
Figure 4: Enforcement and amnesties in a federation   17
 
On the other hand, onward migration (Mt – M’) is not in the interest of the final destination 
countries in northern Europe. Hence, these countries may consider subsidizing external 
enforcement measures by southern European member states. From the host country’s 
perspective a subsidy means that the marginal cost of enforcement is reduced. The optimal 
subsidy equals the shift of the MB curve, i.e. either BF or DE, as this will induce a level of 
enforcement which just reduces the number of those slipping through the border by the 
number of onward migrants. As a consequence the number of legalized immigrants will go 
back to Mt+1 – Mt.  Marginal costs and benefits of enforcement are equalized again in F and 
the stock of irregular aliens living in the host country is again Mt.  
When dealing with interregional transfer payments an additional problem may arise in a 
federation. This problem occurred actually in the summer of 2007 when the aforementioned 
Nautilus project was suspended. Enforcing the EU external borders has the characteristics of a 
public good for EU member countries. Due to free internal movement, every country benefits 
from border enforcement through decreased migratory pressure. A well-known problem in the 
theory of public goods is the free-rider phenomenon. It occurs when none of the countries can 
be excluded from the benefits of tighter borders although it may withdraw its own financing 
share. This leads to a prisoner’s dilemma situation in which no one has an incentive to finance 
the public good and supply will break down at last. The suspension of the Nautilus program in 
July 2007 was a good example for this phenomenon in which the joint support for border 
enforcement was abandoned due to a lack of financing.
35 
Note that interregional transfer payments resembling Pigouvian subsidies are only introduced 
when interregional spillovers are in fact a relevant problem. This can be seen from the case of 
Malta where recently many illegal immigrants arrived by boat due to its proximity to North 
Africa. While the number of immigrants relative to population is huge, little support from 
other EU member states is given to Malta. In particular, other member states are rejecting any 
reception of migrants from Malta. This strategy is hardly surprising as Malta faces a specific 
problem which does not exist for Spain or Italy. Being an island, Malta’s illegal immigrants 
are caught there and unable to move on to other member states. Without externalities, not 
supporting Malta is therefore the optimal strategy for the rest of the EU member states. This 
explains why Malta can expect little support from the rest of the EU. 
 
4.2 Foreign aid as migration deterrent mechanism 
Interregional transfer payments within the EU may possibly be replaced by giving subsidies 
to the transit countries, which is often labelled as foreign aid. In this case the receiving 
countries are those from where the illegal migrants start their journey to Europe, for example 
Morocco or Libya. This policy may alleviate migration pressure as well. Theoretical works 
dealing with this possibility are Myers and Papageorgiou (2000) and Dula et al. (2006) who 
analyze how the money should optimally be allocated between spending on border 
enforcement and granting foreign aid. Concrete examples for this procedure are given in 
Carling (2007) where the agreements between Spain and several African states are analyzed. 
For instance, Morocco allows Spain to return Moroccans who have entered Spain without 
authorization. Further examples are the European-African summits in Rabat and Tripoli in 
June and November 2006, where the EU promised to give an amount of 18 billion Euros over 
a period of seven years to some African states. The money ought to be used for a reduction of 
the migratory pressure from Africa to Europe.
36 
                                                 
35 Cf. Deutsche Welle (2007) 
36 Cf. Kohnert (2006)   18
Compared to an inner-EU transfer mechanism this procedure has some disadvantages from a 
fiscal federalism perspective. At the same time the procedure is attractive to policy makers as 
it appears to offer more practical solutions; for instance, the migratory pressure at the EU 
border is reduced when border enforcement takes place already in Morocco (the enforcement 
measures as well as the enforcement intensity and costs are nevertheless basically the same). 
The disadvantages come from the fact that there is less control over the proper use of funds 
when money is transferred to non-EU governments. Specifically, hardly any “second-round 
punishment” in case of misbehaviour is possible. Secondly, the theory of fiscal federalism 
shows that conditional or “matching” grants (such as the common co-financing of subsidies in 
the EU) are welfare-superior to unconditional grants (such as subsidies labelled as foreign 
aid). The reason is that conditional grants are not only cheaper but also improve the policy of 
the subsidy recipient in a welfare-improving way. Since co-financing may be possible with a 
EU member state such as Spain, it will not work with rather poor states such as Libya or 
Algeria.       
 
4.3 Increasing the possibilities for legal immigration 
Another alternative in coping with the problem of illegal migration is to increase the 
possibilities of legal entry to the EU. As EU Commissioner Frattini stated in September 2007 
the EU has to deal with the challenge of an aging society in which the population will shrink 
by 20 million until the year 2025.
37 To satisfy the demand for workers he proposed the 
introduction of a so-called Blue Card which would resemble the US Green Card. The Blue 
Card would enable individuals from third countries to receive a work permit for two years at 
first, but which may eventually be extended. However, the mobility between EU member 
countries should be limited. In broadening the “front door” for legal migrants to the EU, the 
migratory pressure of illegal migrants would presumably decline. However, the previously 
discussed problems of inner-EU spillovers of immigrants will remain to exist. When 
immigrants aim at moving to a member state with rather restrictive Blue Card policy, they 
may consider to move first to a member state with a liberal policy and then move on. Only at 
the price of restricting the freedom of movement of all EU citizens this may be avoided.  
 
5. Conclusion 
Immigration amnesties are a controversial policy tool in the EU. While the influx of illegal 
immigrants becomes increasingly a concern for the southern member states, these countries 
respond, besides investing efforts in external and internal enforcement, by granting legal 
status to illegal aliens.  This policy measure is – due to the lack of coordination in the EU – 
mainly a non-cooperative decision of a single country, ignoring effects on fellow EU member 
states. 
Our examination has explored an economic approach to understand the granting of amnesties 
to illegal migrants in a federal setting like the EU. While the existing literature on 
immigration amnesties focuses on the case of a single independent legalizing country we have 
expanded this analysis to the case where the legalizing country is part of a federation with 
little restrictions on labor and household mobility. In this setting some new aspects have to be 
considered. For instance, the immigration policy of the legalizing country does not only affect 
the welfare of its own residents but also the welfare in the fellow member states. Those 
countries are affected by the increased mobility of legalized migrants and therefore by a 
higher migratory pressure of unskilled individuals. 
                                                 
37 Cf. Frattini (2007)   19
We demonstrated in a simple framework which connects marginal benefits and marginal costs 
of border enforcement that the legalizing country grants an excessive amnesty to illegal aliens 
from the federal perspective. This behaviour is caused through the expected onward migration 
of legalized migrants, which decreases the marginal benefit of border enforcement. 
There are several possibilities for the fellow member countries, respectively the body of the 
EU, to alleviate this problem. An obvious measure, derived from the theory of fiscal 
federalism, is granting interregional transfers for a public good such as the enforcement of 
external borders. In the case of southern European borders such a measure can indeed be 
observed by the activities of the FRONTEX agency to support the southern maritime border. 
By decreasing the marginal cost of border enforcement for the Mediterranean countries an 
incentive for them arises to grant a smaller amnesty to its illegal aliens and thereby increasing 
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